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POLICE REFORM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: STATE, DEMOCRACY 
AND INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
The article takes as its starting point an assertion by Clifford Shearing that there is 
a lack of synchronisation between patterns of policing in established democracies and 
the international policing assistance programmes they pursue.  This provides a 
background against which to examine concrete examples of multilateral (UN and EU) 
and bilateral (UK) assistance to post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The discussion of 
these programmes is set in the context of ongoing debates on democratic policing and 
explores problems and needs experienced in policing post-war and post-socialist 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  International responses to these problems and needs are 
examined and a mixed picture emerges in which multilateral assistance schemes 
appear to suggest Shearing’s concerns remain pertinent ten years on, while bilateral 
assistance from the UK suggests that there are circumstances in which international 
policing assistance escapes the framework of the state and recognises the importance 
of non-state actors in security provision.   
Key words: state; democratisation; police; reform; Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
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INTRODUCTION 
On 14 December 1995 representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia 
and Yugoslavia gathered in Paris to sign the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, marking the beginning of a process of reconstruction, 
reform and democratisation.  On the same day, at a conference organised by the US 
Departments of State and Justice, Clifford Shearing presented a paper describing the 
limitations of current trends in policing assistance to emerging democracies 
(published as Shearing 1997).  Shearing’s basic claim can be broken down in to two 
parts: firstly, policing assistance focuses primarily on the democratisation of state 
police; and secondly, in doing so it neglects the development of “networked policing” 
characteristic of established democracies, so represents a limited or partial 
understanding of policing in particular and governance more generally.  This paper 
asks to what extent international agencies in BiH have engaged with the challenges of 
democratising state police institutions, and to what extent they have engaged with a 
broader understanding of policing beyond the framework of the state.  International 
policing assistance has constantly featured in BiH over the ten years since Shearing 
delivered his speech; as such it is an ideal site in which to consider the continued 
relevance of his concerns.   
In the sections that follow, the paper summarises a selection of literature 
representing ‘conventional wisdom’ on policing and democracy before outlining why 
Shearing sees this wisdom as a limited basis for policing assistance to emerging 
democracies.  Following this, the paper sets out the specific context of policing 
assistance in BiH, examining the impact of authoritarian government, war, and 
economic transition policing bodies.  The bulk of the paper will then concentrate on 
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three examples of policing assistance to BiH: the two successive major international 
policing missions under UN and EU auspices are considered together, and support the 
contention that international policing assistance focuses predominantly on state 
policing; secondly the work of the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) is presented as an example of policing assistance escaping the constraints of a 
state-bounded framework.   
POLICING, DEMOCRACY AND THE STATE 
Shearing’s 1995 paper begins with an analysis of ‘conventional wisdom’ on 
policing, democracy and the state.  He observes the police to be a critical institution in 
frameworks of democratic governance and cites Bayley (1995) in support.  There is 
no shortage of further material on which he could have drawn.  In BiH, the outgoing 
High Representative Carlos Westendorp remarked in 1999 that policing was one of 
three sectors most vital to democratisation (16th Report of the High Representative 
1999).  Jones and colleagues describe the police “the most central public service in a 
modern state,” protecting those fundamental freedoms underpinning democracy 
(1996: 187).  Marenin (1998) argues that without a democratised and effective police 
service, political democracy is unlikely to succeed.  Drawing on experience in 
Ukraine, Beck (2001) observes that the police have the opportunity either to hinder or 
advance democratisation; their subsequent restraint in public order policing after 
contested elections illustrated difference that policing can make in moving towards 
democracy.   
The potential association between state police action and the maintenance of 
democratic government is clear.  Police institutions might also serve as an indicator of 
the level of democratisation in a given state and a number of authors have attempted 
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to develop ‘democratic criteria’ against which police can be judged.  Marks, writing 
on South Africa, states that police behaviour is indicative of “a government’s 
operational commitment to democracy” (2000: 558) and elsewhere develops criteria 
against which to judge the democratic nature of policing: a structure representative of 
the policed population; community orientation and proactive modes of behaviour; and 
a perception of the public as clients (Marks 2003).  Another scheme, offered by Jones, 
Newburn and Smith (1996) lists seven principles: equity, delivery of service, 
responsiveness, distribution of power, information, redress, and participation.  
Importantly, the criteria are listed in order of priority so that responsiveness is 
qualified by principles of equity.  The scheme neutralises the challenge of the ‘tyranny 
of the majority’ potentially faced by democratic institutions, and might perhaps be 
argued to be criteria for policing in liberal democracies, based on concepts of 
citizenship and rights.  These analyses are focused very much on the state police and 
the role they play in supporting democracy.   
Shearing does not challenge the validity of these conceptualisations of democratic 
policing, nor the importance of efforts to assist emerging democracies in creating 
structures of policing that respond to the needs of ordinary citizens without political 
interference.  This is, he says, “clearly a path that must be negotiated by emerging 
democracies” (1997: 30).  Yet, while acknowledging their validity, Shearing claims 
that, by focusing exclusively on the state, they fail to present a full picture of 
contemporary policing in the established democracies of Western (donor) states where 
security provision is not a state monopoly.  Recent years have seen many challenges 
to the notion of the state as the sole provider of law, order and security.  A generalised 
retreat or reshaping of the state (Müller and Wright 1994) has been described with 
particular reference to the sphere of security provision and criminal justice (Garland 
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1996; Loader and Walker 2001; O'Malley 1997; Rose 2000).  The reconfiguration of 
the state has been attributed to various factors.  Shearing himself (1994) points to a 
growing recognition of the limits of state police when faced with private spaces.  In 
this analysis state recognition of such limits leads to efforts to harness the capacity of 
other bodies to achieve order and security, while individual recognition leads to 
various private paths to security: the recruitment of private patrols, vigilantism, or the 
purchase of security technologies and hardware.  O’Malley and Palmer (1996) have 
noted the increasing dominance of a market-based paradigm in which problems of 
government are framed.  It is in this context, accompanying the rise of consumerism, 
that O’Malley (1997) locates the ‘hollowing out of the nation state’ and the relocation 
of various public services in the private domain.  Among others, Loader and Sparks 
(2002) describe the commodification of policing.  Shearing has recognised a new 
conceptualisation of security as a commodity with implications for the marketisation 
of security provision and the redefinition of policing.  Regardless of the theoretical 
approach used to explain the origins of these trends, Shearing (1997) argues that they 
reflect actual developments; whether one thinks them positive or negative they have 
to be acknowledged and engaged with.  It is this acknowledgment and engagement 
that Shearing argues is missing from overseas policing assistance, leaving it focused 
primarily on state organs.  Loader (2000) has provided a strong basis for 
understanding how regulation might ensure that the principles of democratic policing, 
explored above, might be extended to cover more broadly conceived networks of 
security providers.  Shearing in his Washington paper (1997), and elsewhere with 
others (Dupont et al 2003), has sought to provide theoretical and practical 
underpinnings for reinvigorated and progressive democratic policing assistance 
accounting for the network of bodies engaged in security provision, public, private, or 
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hybrid.   
It is worth observing that the trend towards state-retreat might not be universally 
recognised.  Many works exploring the shifting sands of state and the governance of 
security focus on a narrow set of developed, Anglophonic states.  For example 
O’Malley (1997) refers to developments in Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom while Garland (1996) draws on examples from the UK.  Some work has 
begun to redress this balance, including Shearing’s own suggestions on new directions 
in security provision in South Africa (1997; also Brodeur and Shearing 2005), and 
Wood’s (2004) work on community projects in Argentina.  Yet, recent input from 
continental Europe suggests that an alternative story of continued state dominance in 
security provision can be told in relation to certain states active in the field of 
international policing assistance (Ferret 2004).   
In BiH, we have an opportunity to explore if Shearing’s concerns have been 
addressed in the ten years since he aired them in Washington.  Regardless of the 
position one takes on the democratic credentials of Yugoslav self-management as 
theory or practice, it is clear that the path set out for BiH in 1995 took the country in a 
new democratic direction.  The massively expanded state militias which formed the 
basis of post-war police forces lacked the experience of policing in a liberal 
democratic state, and faced the challenge of addressing the role they had played in the 
war while adjusting to new post-war policing structures.  Since 1995, a number of 
international organisations have been working with governments and police forces in 
BiH to develop models of democratic and accountable policing throughout the 
country.  The combination of international and local influences in BiH, where 
policing policy is being developed in line with reform agenda sponsored by the 
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international community, makes the country an ideal site to examine trends in 
contemporary policing and policing assistance.  This allows us to explore to what 
extent international organisations and development agencies seek to, and are able to, 
go beyond the state in their assistance programmes.   
MAP 1 insert 
The local context in which international organisations implement assistance 
programmes is a complex one, and merits a brief explanation, not least to clarify the 
use of the word ‘state’ in relation to BiH in this paper.  The post-war state of BiH 
(shown in map 1) results from peace agreements negotiated in 1994 in Washington 
and 1995 at Dayton.  The first established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(FBiH), a federal union of ten cantons, eight of which featured either a clear Bosniac 
or Croat majority.  Each Canton has its own police force under an Interior Ministry, 
and a two-tier system of criminal courts (municipal and cantonal) under a Justice 
Ministry.  The federal level of government includes a police force with jurisdiction 
over inter-cantonal crime, a supreme court with appellate and limited first instance 
criminal jurisdiction, and a prison service.  In December 1995, FBiH joined 
Republika Srpska (RS), which featured a unitary structure of government and an 
overwhelming Serb majority1, to re-form BiH within its pre-war boundaries, but as a 
state composed of two asymmetric entities.  The shared institutions of the newly 
formed state had limited competency, primarily covering customs, monetary and 
foreign policy.  While this state-level government had competence over inter-entity 
crimes, this was not backed by any institutional framework.  These levels of 
government were supplemented in 1999 with a further special district in Brko, a 
contentious area linking the North and West of RS with the South and East of the 
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entity.  Residents of Brko district could elect to be citizens of either sub-state entity, 
but also voted for their own assembly, and had their own policing and judicial 
structures.   
In this context, the word ‘state’ might be used to refer to ‘the state government’, 
those shared institutions made up by a rotating three-member Presidency, a Council of 
Ministers, and two parliamentary chambers.  In this sense, specific to BiH, it 
distinguishes state from entity, district, cantonal and municipal governments.  
Simultaneously, ‘state’ might be used more generally to refer to what Copp calls “the 
animated institutions of government”, a system of offices, roles and people engaged in 
producing, administering and enforcing laws (1999: 7).  This second definition must 
be taken to include all levels of government in BiH, national or sub-national.  
Therefore to distinguish between the general concept of ‘the state’ and the particular 
meaning of ‘state’ in BiH’s constitutional set up, ‘state’ will be reserved for the 
general concept while ‘state-level’ will be used when referring to the shared 
institutions of BiH.  Thus, state police would refer to all police forces under cantonal, 
entity, district and state-level governments, while state-level police would refer only 
to those forces established since 2000 and supervised by shared institutions.   
LEGACIES OF SOCIALISM, LEGACIES OF WAR: POST-CONFLICT POLICING 
IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
Before exploring approaches and achievements in international policing assistance 
it is necessary to introduce the post-war context of implementation.  This must 
account for the historical legacies of socialism and of war and the challenges of a shift 
towards a market based economy.    
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Authoritarian-socialist legacies: police militarization, public alienation 
In the former Yugoslavia, the bulk of public policing was carried out by militia, 
structured along military lines and lacking in external accountability at the local level 
(Kutnjak-Ivkovi and Haberfeld 2000)2.  In light of the discussion of policing and 
democracy above, and taking policing as an inherently political activity, some form of 
accountability to those being policed is desirable (Jones 2003).  Militaristic 
hierarchies are not necessarily incompatible with local accountability, but many 
European states with centralised militaristic forces under defence ministry supervision 
(e.g. the French gendarmerie, Italian carabinieri) balance these with local level forces 
(Mawby 2003).  Nor is accountability simply structural.  Marks (2000) states that 
authoritarian traditions and cultures must be challenged.  Where personnel are 
retained from a previous regime, there is a risk that their ‘deep level’ values influence 
the practices of new recruits, perpetuating an occupational culture obstructive to new 
models of police-public relations.  Alienation of the public from an unaccountable and 
unresponsive police force failing to meet their needs discourages cooperation, 
undermining police effectiveness.  In order to address the problems inherited from 
previous authoritarian regimes, shifts in the nature of policing must be visible (Beck 
and Chistyakova 2002); DFID see the need for a paradigm-shift from police force to 
police service (Safety, Security and Accessible Justice 2002).   
Dealing with a violent past: police and war crimes 
The war in BiH between 1992 and 1995 featured the systematic use of public 
police in policies of ethnic cleansing and human rights abuses.  The roots of the police 
role in the war can, in part, be traced back to the constitutional arrangements of the 
former Yugoslavia.  Defence was a federal matter with the People’s Army controlled 
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by central government.  Policing, although overseen from Belgrade, was run primarily 
from republic-level ministries of the interior.  The Public Security Service (Služba 
Javne Bezbednosti) took the form of a militia, organised along military lines with 
commissioned and warrant officers, rank and file, and reservists.  As individual 
republics had no ‘proper’ military as such, the militia took on part of this role when 
war broke out.  The new role required a massive expansion of numbers and saw 
normal entry requirements and training being waived (Kutnjak-Ivkovi and Haberfeld 
2000).  Boundaries between police and army blurred; police became part of the 
offensive and defensive strategies of participants in armed conflict.  In turn, where 
participants sought to implement policies of forced transfer, ethnic cleansing or other 
attacks on civilians, police organisations became involved in these human rights 
abuses.   
A study of the forty-seven defendants found guilty by the International Tribunal at 
the Hague of war crimes committed in BiH by October 20053 reveals that eight (17 
per cent) were convicted for crimes committed while serving as regular or reserve 
police officers, while a further two (4 per cent) were operating as military police 
officers (see table 1).  In addition to these two groups a further twelve individuals (26 
per cent) committed offences while working in prisons and detention camps but in 
roles that could not be definitively attributed to the police.  Boundaries between 
police, military, and civilian political authorities became blurred in the detention 
camps, where each played a role.  Duško Sikirica, security commander at Kertarem 
camp, worked under the authority of the police in Prijedor but wore military uniform 
(Prosecutor v Sikirica 2001).  The camp was established under police orders and 
employed the services of thirty police reserves (Prosecutor v Kvoka 2001).  The 
Konjic barracks, used to detain Bosnian-Serb civilians, came under the joint authority 
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of the police, territorial defence and Croat Defence Council (Hrvatsko Vijee 
Obranje) (Prosecutor v Delali 2001).   
TABLE 1 insert 
Other cases show police officers engaged in forced population transfers, beatings 
and murder (e.g. Prosecutor v Todorovi 2001; Prosecutor v Mrða 2004).  The 
tribunal also highlighted cooperation between police and military and paramilitary 
units outside the camps; this occurred, for example, at Srebrenica, where over 7,000 
civilians were killed (see Prosecutor v Erdemovi 1996; Prosecutor v Simi 2003; 
Prosecutor v Staki 2003).  Police premises were also used for systematic 
programmes of murder (Prosecutor v Jelisi 1999).   
The legacy of the conflict for policing in BiH is clear: the police have been 
implicated in some of the worst excesses of wartime violence against civilians.  As 
the organisation tasked with public protection they were heavily involved in acts 
designed to undermine public security and to harm specific sectors of society.  The 
BiH authorities and international community faced the task of rebuilding public 
confidence in a service burdened by the combined legacies of authoritarianism and of 
its role during the war.  The Hague trials might go some way towards achieving these 
ends, but the level of involvement of the police in war crimes was such that it 
demanded more large scale action, seen in the certification process carried out under 
UN auspices and described below.   
Separatist legacies: new divisions in policing 
Despite the peace brokered in 1994 between the Sarajevo government and 
separatist Bosnian-Croat forces, Mostar remained a vivid illustration of divisions 
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across a range of sectors.  The destruction of the old bridge over the River Neretva 
symbolised the division of the city between Bosnian-Croat administrations 
concentrated in the West and its Bosniac counterpart in the East.  This pattern of 
division was replicated throughout the nascent FBiH.  In the wake of the conflict, the 
UN International Police Task Force (UNIPTF) found itself faced with the task of 
disbanding Bosnian-Croat para-police forces in the area as well as other ‘special’ 
police units throughout FBiH (UNMIBH: Background 1998).  In March 1997 a joint 
police force was established for Mostar (5th Report of the High Representative 1997), 
but there were continuing problems in creating unified cantonal policing structures 
elsewhere (10th Report of the High Representative 1998).   
BiH still featured a high number of police forces for the size of the country despite 
the closure of irregular policing units established during the war, (Report from the 
Commission 2003).  In the initial post-war period, separate forces existed at entity and 
cantonal level, and also for Brko district.  These have been supplemented with 
specialist court police and state-level policing agencies such as the State Border 
Service (SBS).  The geographic fragmentation of policing needs to be understood in 
light of the war and widespread ethnically targeted violence.  Radical decentralisation 
gave each of the constituent peoples (Bosniac, Croat and Serb) a power base and thus 
some kind of guarantee of security.   
Corruption 
The reasons for corruption amongst police are multiple.  Goldsmith (2003) 
observes that resource shortages and low or irregular salaries can lead to corruption.  
Structural factors such as weak mechanisms for accountability can, at the very least, 
facilitate corruption.  A Transparency International (TI) survey in BiH found that just 
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under 15 per cent of respondents had been asked to pay a bribe to a police officer in 
the previous twelve months (Divjak 2004).  The prevalent experience of police 
corruption by the public has a wider impact on levels of trust and cooperation; 55 per 
cent of respondents in the TI survey felt that ‘most’ or ‘almost all’ officers were 
involved in corruption while only 5 per cent felt that hardly any engaged in corrupt 
behaviour.  Corruption goes beyond taking bribes; at least one human rights 
organisation expresses concern over political partisanship in policing, reflecting a 
legacy of political interference in law enforcement.  In the late 1990s, accusations of 
partisan policing were levelled against police in Una Sana Canton; these included the 
failure to investigate crimes against opponents of the Party of Democratic Action 
(Stranka Demokratske Akcije), illegal detention and police brutality (Politics of 
Revenge 1997).   
Post-war landscapes of crime and justice 
Many of the issues explored so far are largely internal to the police: their 
organisational role during the war, their structures emerging from socialist rule and 
war, and corruption.  The final set of problems discussed situates policing in BiH in 
the wider social and criminal justice contexts of the post-war and post-socialist 
period, exploring changes in patterns of crime, changes in public perceptions of 
crime, and wider programmes of criminal justice reform.   
There is widespread acknowledgment that various factors in the shift from 
socialism to market economies and political liberalism result in increased crime and 
awareness of crime (Lewis, 1998; Łos 2002; Plywaczewski 2001; Yakushik 2001; 
Zvekic 2001).  Actual rises and a new sensitivity to crime increase public anxieties 
during periods of rapid social change.  Mawby (1998) recognises the complexity of 
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the situation, noting that the quest for ‘hard’ evidence of quantitative or qualitative 
changes in crime between socialist and post-socialist periods is problematic.  He 
suggests statistics from the socialist era were prone to being massaged and are 
therefore suspect.  Moreover a new relationship between state and citizen may alter 
reporting behaviours.   
A number of post-Yugoslav states have experienced combinations of violent 
conflict with massive political and economic change.  In particular this applies to 
BiH, Croatia and Serbia.  Nikoli-Ristanovi (1998) draws on a range of sources, 
including human rights reports, interviews and personal experience to explain the 
impact of conflict on crime.  She paints a picture in which the black economy 
becomes essential to the continuation of everyday life, providing vital goods and 
employment.  In such an environment, state interests in punishing criminal enterprises 
weaken, and ties between state and criminal enterprises may be formed.  
Criminogenic factors may also be exacerbated by conflict: social disorganisation; 
breakdown of formal/state and informal/community networks of control; and limited 
capacity for collective problem solving.  Criminality learned through experience or 
association iduring conflict may continue in to peacetime.   
Maljevi (2002) notes factors mediating public perceptions of crime and crime 
related risks present in BiH in the wake of the war.  During the war, many lost family 
members who previously played a protective role, increasing their sense of 
vulnerability.  Minority status, especially in the wake of a conflict which manipulated 
perceptions of ethnic difference and separateness, is also central to the perception of 
risk and vulnerability.  Specific incidents like the murder of two elderly Bosnian-Serb 
returnees to the municipality of Drvar on 15 April 1998 (10th Report of the High 
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Representative 1998) and scores of other return-related instances of violence such as 
arson, intimidation and assault increase feelings of anxiety and insecurity among 
returnees in particular.  Moreover, these crimes represent new forms of conventional 
violent crime which the police are expected to deal with.   
Just as changes in policing may impact elsewhere in the criminal justice system, 
for example the number of cases proceeding to court, changes elsewhere in the system 
impact on policing.  This can be seen by looking at one aspect of changes in 
procedural codes recently adopted throughout BiH.  The abolition of the role of the 
investigating judge, part of root and branch reform of the judicial systems of BiH, has 
put a greater investigative responsibility on police and prosecutors, who must 
establish a new relationship with each other (Sijeri-oli 2001).  At a time of 
ongoing internal change, wider shifts in crime and the criminal justice system create 
additional pressures on BiH’s police services.   
Clearly the police forces of BiH faced numerous problems at the end of the war 
above and beyond the challenges posed by the legacy of authoritarian policing which 
the country shared with other emerging European democracies.  The police services 
needed ‘cleansing’ in some way to distance and distinguish themselves from those 
engaged in war-time persecution; they had to find a coherent way to police the 
country in spite of the organisational patchwork that policing in BiH had become; 
finally they had to face up to public perceptions of widespread corruption while 
adjusting to the challenges of policing the new BiH.  The following section will 
explore how those states seeking to assist BiH on its path to establishing democratic 
modes of policing have sought to address these challenges, and to what extent they 
have done this within and beyond a framework of state provision of policing.  Firstly 
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this will be discussed in relation to multilateral assistance provided by the UN and 
EU, supporting Shearing’s concerns that international policing assistance remains 
bounded in terms of the state.  Secondly, the paper explores the work of DFID as an 
example of policing assistance beyond the framework provided by the state.   
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE: STABILISATION AND REFORM 
Core civilian missions and policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Annex 11 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) provides for an 
International Police Force under UN authority.  The force was to assist entities in 
meeting constitutional obligations to “ensure a safe and secure environment for all 
persons in their respective jurisdictions” (GFAP 1995: Annex 11[1]).  When this UN 
force disbanded in December 2002 the role was taken over by the European Union 
Police Mission (EUPM).  This second mission, continuing to identify its purpose in 
terms of Annex 11, was scheduled to run to the end of 2005, but has been extended by 
two years.  The European mission’s initial aim was to “establish sustainable policing 
arrangements under Bosnia and Herzegovina ownership in accordance with best 
European and International practise, thereby raising current BiH police standards” 
(Mission Statement 2003).  The following section explores the different means by 
which the UN and EU policing missions have successively worked alongside, and at 
times against, the police forces in attempts to create reformed policing services 
throughout BiH.  It will be argued that these two agencies, representing the core of 
post-war policing assistance in BiH since 1995, have focused primarily, if not 
exclusively, on the state as the provider of policing, confirming Shearing’s assertions 
in his Washington paper.   
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The initial task force mandated by Annex 11 was headed by a Commissioner, 
appointed by the UN Secretary General, receiving guidance from the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR), and reporting to OHR and the Secretary General.  The 
initial IPTF role included monitoring and facilitating enforcement activities, offering 
advice and training to police forces, advising government bodies, assessing threats 
and evaluating capabilities, accompanying and assisting police, and reporting human 
rights violations to the authorities.  This expanded in December 1996 to include 
proactive investigation of human rights abuses by law enforcement personnel (From 
Promise to Reality 1997).  Initially mandated for one year, the challenges facing the 
task force were such that its mandate was soon extended.  The situation in BiH was 
tense: while return programmes struggled to reverse the ethnic segregation imposed 
during war, police forces still included officers complicit in war crimes; illegal 
‘special’ police units existed and even those police forces with official recognition 
could not be relied upon for the cooperation demanded by Annex 11.  The UN 
mandate eventually ran to seven years, and was followed immediately by a similar 
programme under EU auspices.  In response to challenges in BiH, the UN interpreted 
its mandate to provide a number of tools to reform policing, reflecting a two-pronged 
approach based on enforcement and cooperation: investigation and public criticism of 
police; disciplinary measures such as imposed probationary periods and the removal 
of officers from duty; direct challenges to police authority over the inter-entity 
boundary line (IEBL); training; and legislative and policy support. 
The least forceful enforcement-oriented intervention was public critique of police.  
Examples can be seen in strong criticisms of police use of force, including firearms, at 
a Bajram march of Bosniacs to a West Mostar cemetery in 1997 (From Promise to 
Reality 1997); again over the use of force in the arrest of Goran Vasi; and over 
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failures in investigation of the murder of Bosnian-Serb returnees in Drvar (Concerns 
in Europe January-June 1998: Bosnia-Herzegovina 1998).  In the first example, 
subsequent domestic investigations resulted in criminal charges against officers.  Yet 
even then, the slow pace of the process highlighted recalcitrance among officers 
expected to instigate proceedings against their colleagues (15th Report of the High 
Representative 1999).   
Intervention was more intrusive in early 1999, following an investigation of local 
policing in the Bosnian-Croat majority municipality of Stolac.  All officers were 
placed on a three month probationary period (Concerns in Europe January-June 
1999: Bosnia-Herzegovina 1999), however the experiences of the task force during 
investigations underlined a further problem.  UNIPTF officers were attacked by locals 
supportive of the mainly Bosnian-Croat police (Concerns in Europe July-December 
1998: Bosnia-Herzegovina 1999).  This example problematises the principle of local 
control over policing, especially where a majority may exercise undue influence at the 
expense of others.  Differential service provision from police based on ethnicity is not 
unique to BiH; yet given recent history, and the desire for sustainable minority 
returns, there is an argument for strong checks against local abuse of police powers.  
In this context Jones et al’s (1996) scheme prioritising equity over responsiveness 
seems fitting to encourage responsive policing within the boundaries of a liberal 
democracy.   
From 1998 onwards, UNIPTF began a major process certifying individual officers 
with the authority to serve in BiH.  The process involved three stages: registration, 
screening by questionnaire, and in-depth background checks.  Overall, 23,751 officers 
and other staff registered, of whom 16,803 (71 per cent) were granted provisional 
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authorisation after the second stage, with 15,786 (66 per cent) receiving full 
certification (Report of the Secretary General on UNMIBH 2002).  Background 
checks were complemented with training in human rights, public order and crime 
related topics.  The certification project has faced numerous difficulties: the UN 
recognised attempts by law enforcement agencies to circumvent certification 
procedures (Report of the Secretary General on UNMIBH 2001); since the process 
closed, summons have been issued from The Hague against two serving officers, 
Novo Rajak and Boban Simi, suggesting gaps in coverage (Freeman 2004).  In 
February and June 2004, further action was taken by OHR to remove five officers for 
involvement in “egregious criminal activities” and giving support to indicted war 
crime suspect Radovan Karadži5.  A further round of removals as part of “direct and 
sweeping action” against public officials seen to have contributed to “institutional 
failure to purge from the political landscape… conditions conducive to the provision 
of material support and sustenance to individuals indicted [for war crimes]” saw a 
further eight police officials in RS dismissed and barred from public office6.  These 
OHR removals all took place after the end of the certification process.  Most recently 
a number of officers decertified by the UN have challenged the procedure in domestic 
courts under the European Convention of Human Rights (Press Release SC/8019 
2004).   
In one of their strongest actions, UNIPTF, supported by NATO’s Stabilisation 
Force (SFOR), directly challenged police authority over the IEBL and freedom of 
movement between the two entities of BiH.  Amidst ongoing concerns over police 
abuses of human rights (3rd Report of the High Representative 1996; 4th Report of 
the High Representative 1996), police conduct around the IEBL was described as the 
“greatest obstacle to freedom of movement” (5th Report of the High Representative 
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1997: s. 85).  This included intimidation and arbitrary fines imposed on those crossing 
the line between FBiH and RS.  In May 1997, any IEBL checkpoints set up without 
prior UNIPTF approval were declared illegal and dismantled with support from SFOR 
troops.  The government of RS claimed that this exceeded the terms of the UNIPTF 
mandate and instructed police not to cooperate.  The issue of obstruction to freedom 
of movement was eventually addressed outside the sphere of criminal justice by an 
OHR decision to implement a scheme of uniform vehicle registration, making it 
impossible to identify a vehicle’s entity of origin (Decision on the deadlines for the 
implementation of the new uniform licence plate system 1998).   
In addition to these enforcement based interventions, the task force played a wider 
role in developing a legislative framework for policing and in attempting to establish 
police forces representative of the population of BiH.  At a relatively early stage in 
their mandate UNIPTF worked with OHR and domestic authorities to produce a 
model law for cantonal policing (4th Report of the High Representative 1996).  In late 
1998 the mission negotiated with the OHR and RS government to produce a 
framework for police reform, which included the recruitment of over 2000 non-Serb 
officers (24 per cent of the force), and tying the service into IPTF protocols on 
selection and training.  In the same period working groups were established on 
minority recruitment in the cantons of FBiH (12th Report of the High Representative 
1999).  A number of different methods were employed to develop minority 
representation, including voluntary redeployment, selection of minority candidates for 
police academies, refresher training for returnee officers, recruitment campaigns 
targeted at women, and housing assistance for officers willing to relocate.   
A UN matrix presents a vision of competence and integrity on two different levels: 
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individual and organisational.  The endpoint of the individual stream is certification of 
officers, while for organisations it is UN accreditation for basic democratic standards 
in policing.  In order to reach this goal police forces had to be adequately resourced, 
with effective management and human resource systems and willing to engage in 
inter-force cooperation (competence), while having an inclusive multi-ethnic make 
up, freedom from political interference, and featuring transparency and public 
accountability (integrity).  The introduction of Independent Cantonal Commissioners 
and Entity Directors to block political interference by 2002 was one UN initiative 
aimed at achieving these organisational goals (Report of the Secretary General on 
UNMIBH 2002).  Towards the end of their mandate, UNIPTF became involved in 
preparing for the establishment of a state-level force to target organised and high level 
crime, the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA).  This work was continued 
by the EUPM when it took over in 2003.   
The above discussion offers some indication of the multiple approaches adopted 
under the UN in order to work towards democratised public police services in BiH, 
meeting several of the criteria highlighted by Jones et al (1996).  The EUPM 
continues this work under the authority of an international Police Commissioner and 
the EU Special Representative, a role filled by the High Representative since 2002.  
Continuity between UNIPTF and EUPM was assured by the retention of UN 
personnel by the new mission (Report of the Secretary General on UNMIBH 2002), 
and through ongoing work on projects like SIPA.  The EUPM also participated in the 
discussions on restructuring police services in BiH preceding the establishment of a 
Commission on the subject (25th Report of the High Representative 2004).  The focus 
of the EUPM has not been solely on political aspects of reform and the mission has 
deployed a large number of officers in support functions.  In January 2004, 396 
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officers were deployed from EU states (including France - 85, Germany - 76, the UK 
- 55 and Italy - 51) with a further 99 officers from outside the EU.  Officers are 
deployed throughout the country: 79 officers are spread across the four HQ 
departments including the Commissioner’s office, operations and administration, but 
the largest single concentration of officers is represented by the 65 officers working 
with the State Border Service (SBS) (Deployment of Police Officers 2004).   
The remits of the IPTF and EUPM have been largely limited to working with 
individual police bodies within the existing institutional framework of state provision 
of policing.  Where they have looked beyond existing bodies, they have still done so 
within the overall framework of state policing, for example with the establishment of 
state level bodies such as SBS, SIPA, and judicial police serving the Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  In spite of all the work undertaken by the UNIPTF and EUPM, 
OHR argues that much remains to be done in the development of policing in BiH.  
The work of UNIPTF is described as “post-conflict stabilisation” while the era of the 
EUPM was to be one of “capacity building and reform” (Report to European 
Parliament: July-December 2002 2002).  Subsequent reports note that the EUPM has 
tentatively stepped beyond this into discussions on a broader programme of police 
restructuring (25th Report of the High Representative 2004).  While stabilisation in a 
post-conflict situation might be intrinsically linked to a continued focus on existing 
institutions, we might ask why the capacity building and reform agenda of the EUPM 
has not led to greater development of policing capacity beyond the state.  In short, 
why has EU policing assistance continued to be bound by the ‘conventional wisdom’ 
that, according to Shearing, gives an incomplete understanding of contemporary 
policing?   
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There appear to be three reasons why this might be the case, the first structural, the 
second motivational and the third revisiting the conventional wisdom that Shearing 
seeks to move beyond.  Both the UN and EU policing missions to BiH operated on 
the framework of secondments from state police in donor countries.  In a sense, this 
locked them in to a framework of state policing provision.  Other agencies operating 
in the field of policing in BiH, such as aid and development agencies, might not be 
restricted by such a structure, yet it is clear that it has been a constraining factor in 
how the two core policing missions to BiH have operated.  Police officers employed 
by donor states were brought to BiH to work alongside, monitor and assist officers in 
other state services.   
With regard to the EUPM only, the focus on state policing bodies at all levels, and 
particularly on state-level bodies such as SIPA and SBS, may stem from the fact that 
international policing assistance is not solely altruistic.  During fieldwork in BiH, one 
respondent characterised EU interventions in policing as “self-interested generosity”; 
the term is well illustrated when Javier Solana notes the threat of a poorly policed BiH 
to EU member states (e.g. Interview with Sead Numanovi for Dnevni Avaz (BiH) 
2004).  This threat does not stem from localised disputes which threaten peace in local 
communities in the manner described by Brodeur and Shearing (2005) in relation to 
South African Peace Committees. Rather Solana is referring to what Chris Patten 
(2004), as Commissioner for External Relations, described as “those sorts of crime 
prone to cross borders and spread throughout Europe”: the smuggling of drugs, guns 
and people; crimes dealt with by and between states.   
Finally, to argue that the continued basis of state provision as a model for 
international policing assistance represents a failure of donor-democracies to 
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synchronise international assistance with domestic practice requires an acceptance of 
Shearing’s views on the role of non-state agencies in contemporary policing practice 
across a number of jurisdictions.  To engage fully with that debate is beyond the scope 
of this article, but it is still a debate that ought to be acknowledged.  Ferret (2004) 
argues that the role of non-state agencies in policing tasks is strictly limited in France 
and Spain, rather that tensions are between local and national provision firmly within 
the framework of the state.  Continental European states play an important role in 
police assistance in BiH: in January 2004, 54 per cent of EUPM officers were drawn 
from France, Germany and Italy.  A continued emphasis on state-centred models of 
policing need not be taken to represent a discrepancy between domestic arrangements 
and international assistance; it may simply be the dominant model in a cooperative 
venture between states with different patterns of domestic policing.   
Micro-level reform: the Department for International Development and local 
experimentation 
This final sub-section will focus on one organisation whose work suggests that, in 
at least one established democracy, the role of non-state participants in policing and 
the relevance of this to policing assistance has been recognised in the ten years since 
Shearing’s Washington address.  While the core of policing assistance in BiH has 
been carried out under the auspices of agencies with specific international mandates, a 
number of other agencies have been involved in projects on a smaller scale; these 
include DFID, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), OSCE, 
UNICEF, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the US 
Department of Justice, and Save the Children UK.  The work of DFID will be 
explored to illustrate how bilateral UK policing assistance in BiH represents a shift 
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from wholly state-focused assistance.  The work of DFID in BiH forms part of a 
larger programme, Balkans Safety, Security and Access to Justice, covering several 
countries.  In turn, this is part of a strategy for global poverty reduction.  DFID ties 
security, justice and conflict prevention to economic growth through guarantees for 
economic rights and the development of a climate for investment in future wellbeing 
(Safety, Security and Accessible Justice 2002).  Thus DFID’s policing work forms 
part of a general humanitarian and developmental agenda.   
While working with entity level ministries to develop the capacity for strategic 
planning (project B1), DFID also operates two pilot projects in the towns of Žepe 
and Prijedor, focusing on the justice sector (project B3) and community policing and 
community safety (project B2).  DFID selected such an approach for a number of 
reasons: funding levels mean that DFID has to carefully target resources; similarly, 
small scale pilot projects are an economical test of reform programmes and success 
may be used to promote wider implementation; finally, the two sites were chosen 
because of the impact of past conflict.  Ethnically-based parallel administrations 
persisted for several years in Žepe.  Prijedor, in RS, saw large scale ethnic cleansing 
during the war and now hosts a large number of displaced Serbs, both from within 
BiH and from Croatia.  Areas with fractured communities and high levels of inter-
community tension are the most challenging locations for the introduction of 
community policing and community safety programmes.  Success in these sites would 
help to rebuild local communities and suggests a good chance of success elsewhere.   
Project B2 currently has two distinct components and reflects a holistic 
understanding of security provision, which goes some way towards Shearing’s (1997) 
notion of escaping state-monopolised visions of security provision.  The first 
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component does focus on state agencies, primarily the police, working directly with 
officers to improve policing skills, practices and leadership, and promoting 
partnership.  The second component looks beyond the state to develop community 
involvement in security provision, through consultative groups, crime audits, crime 
and disorder strategies, while at the same time addressing broader security concerns 
through conflict-resolution and returnee safety (Project Bosnia 2 2003).  These two 
components will eventually feed into a third component where lessons learned are 
reviewed and fed in to relevant ministries.  These components represent an attempt to 
ensure community involvement in decisions relating to police priorities.  They are a 
consequence of DFID’s assertion that “the state on its own cannot provide SSAJ 
[safety, security and access to justice].  The provision of law, order and justice is also 
the concern of civil society” (Safety, Security and Accessible Justice 2002: 21).   
In its use of public consultation over the role of state-provided security services 
such as the police, the project still locates security provision as a largely state-centred 
responsibility.  Yet by encouraging communities to play a proactive role in conflict 
resolution and returnee safety DFID displays a commitment to non-state action in 
preventative approaches to crime and disorder, and here it would suggest that both 
decision making and implementation can be located at a local level with non-state 
bodies.  DFID further recognise the ongoing importance of the state in a third 
component, where the state provides the means to roll out positive elements of local 
initiatives.   
Unlike the internationally mandated bodies such as UNIPTF and EUPM, DFID has 
no direct access to sources of executive power.  Thus the schemes in Žepe and 
Prijedor work on the basis of consultancy and through building client relationships.  
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This is in line with DFID guidelines promoting local ownership as a path to 
sustainability (Safety, Security and Accessible Justice 2002).  One result of this 
approach is that reform may progress more slowly than those implemented by other 
agencies, yet the flexible and cooperative approach builds relationships of trust, 
allowing new modes of thinking about policing to take root without creating 
resentment, and allows DFID to go beyond the state in conceptualising security 
provision.  While larger projects like DFID’s B1 work in close cooperation with 
higher level government agencies and core international civilian missions, smaller 
projects such as B2 and B3 do not necessarily fit into this framework.  As a result 
there is a risk that their work may be overlooked and nullified by larger reform 
strategies.  Recent attempts to restructure of BiH’s police driven by the OHR and EC 
through a Police Restructuring Commission represent a major risk to micro-projects.  
While DFID has been consulted in discussions about restructuring, it is one voice 
among many.  The creation of new policing units and structures of management could 
fundamentally alter the field in which DFID is engaged.   
What emerges from DFID’s work is a mixed picture of policing assistance to a 
nascent democracy.  The projects have a rather holistic approach; the importance of 
policing to broader issues of peace-building and democratic consolidation is 
recognised, tying DFID’s work into broader issues of rebuilding divided communities, 
resolving local conflicts, and ensuring the safety of displaced persons returning to 
their pre-war homes.  Likewise, the project is not limited to policing, but sees policing 
as part of a larger field in need of reform and reconstruction.  Accompanying projects 
work with individual courts and relevant ministries in accordance with DFID 
guidelines on a sector based approach (Clegg et al. 2000; Safety, Security and 
Accessible Justice 2002).  The policing project also suggests DFID recognises the 
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complexity of contemporary security governance, where neither rowing nor steering 
need be state monopolies.  In doing so, the project says something about policing in 
contexts beyond BiH; it points to a trend in policing witnessed elsewhere, where local 
consultative groups and crime and disorder audits seek to gauge local concerns and 
feed these back in to local policing policies involving a range of partners.  Finally, the 
work of DFID is important as an example of more general assistance programmes to 
transitional societies; it shows the benefits of cooperation with other agencies 
involved in reform and reconstruction alongside a willingness to go beyond the 
specific programmes of these bodies.  Yet while such an approach offers BiH’s 
citizens an alternative vision of policing, it runs the risk of being lost in the growing 
pace of police restructuring in the country.   
CONCLUSIONS 
Shearing’s concern about a lack of synchronisation between domestic policing in 
established democracies and the policing assistance they give to emerging 
democracies has provided a starting point in this discussion of three examples of 
assistance programmes.  Through the example of DFID we have seen an attempt to 
involve communities in policing decisions and ongoing projects to create a secure 
environment.  Thus, in the ten years since Shearing raised his concerns in 
Washington, and since BiH stepped out on the path to peace and democracy, we can 
see that at least one agency has moved beyond conventional wisdom towards a more 
complex vision of policing in their assistance programmes.  Yet mainstream policing 
assistance to Bosnia has remained focused on a paradigm dominated by state 
provision.  This paper has proposed three possible reasons, each of which may 
contribute to the continuing focus on state provision in policing assistance in the case 
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of BiH: the structures of the main agencies delivering police assistance; the motives 
of donors; and the domestic policing structures of certain donor states.  However, 
policing assistance itself is provided by a network of donors, including agencies like 
DFID, working on a relatively small scale.  Through these we might see the 
emergence of models of policing assistance that come closer to those Shearing aspires 
to, and that he has worked towards developing.   
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ENDNOTES 
[1] UNHCR estimates cited by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
suggest the composition of Republika Srpska went from being 54.3 per cent Serb in 
1991 to 96.7 per cent in 1997: “Due to the massive ethnic cleansing during the war… 
Republika Srpska is now an almost ethnically homogenous entity.” (2000: paragraphs 
86-87).   
[2] Davidovic (1993) does describe self-protection as an aspect of the Yugoslav 
self-management system.  This consisted of local preventative measures against flood, 
fire, vandalism and violence, and a security service for productive enterprises akin to 
private security provision in a market economy.  These forms do not seem to have 
survived the war in tact. 
[3] These forty-seven defendants represent those who had been found guilty in a 
first instance tribunal for offences committed in BiH, and whose convictions had not, 
by 26 October 2005, been reversed in appeals proceedings.  Cases relating to crimes 
outside BiH, resulting in acquittal, withdrawn before the conclusion of proceedings, 
or still pending, have been excluded.   
[4] A number of individuals in this group played an ambiguous role.  It was 
unclear whether they answered to military, police, or other civilian authorities, for 
example Goran Jelisi (Prosecutor v Jelisi 1999) and Dragan Kolundžija (Prosecutor 
v Sikirica 2001). 
[5] All decisions to remove public employees and politicians are listed by date on 
the OHR website (www.ohr.int.decisions/archive.asp).  The removals referred to here 
took place on 10 February (Dragan Baševi, Veljko Borovanin and Ivan Sara) and 
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30 June 2004 (Mile Peji and Zoran Petri).   
[6] Those barred from office in this second round of removals were Svetislav Joki 
and Pero Sakota (1 July 2004), and Predrag Jovii, Milorad Mari, Milomir Malis, 
Zoran Ostoji, Petko Pavlovi and Mrsko Skoaji (17 December 2004).   
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Abbreviations 
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina  RS Republika Srpska 
CIDA Canadian International 
Development Agency 
 SBS State Border Service 
DFID Department for International 
Development 
 SFOR Stabilisation Force 
EUPM European Union Police 
Mission 
 SIDA Swedish International 
Development Agency 
FBiH Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 SIPA State Investigation and 
Protection Agency 
GFAP General Framework 
Agreement for Peace 
 SSAJ Safety, Security and Access 
to Justice 
IEBL Inter-Entity Boundary Line  TI Transparency International 
OHR Office of the High 
Representative 
 UNIPTF UN International Police 
Task Force 
OSCE Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 
 UNMIBH UN Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
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Map 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina, showing entities, cantons and Brko District 
 
White: Republika Srpska 
Grey (various): FBiH and Cantons 
Stripes: Brko District 
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Table 1 Wartime role of those found guilty of crimes in BiH at the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991.  26 October 2005. 
  Percentage N 
Defence/Military 36.2 17 
Camps/Prisons4 25.5 12 
Police 17.0 8 
Politics 17.0 8 
Military Police 4.3 2 
Total 100 47 
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